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PRIVATE LAW
prove a debt of the deceased if no suit was brought against him
prior to his death "unless suit to enforce the debt or liability" is
instituted against the succession within one year of its opening.
At the same time the court approved the use of parol to prove
the payment of a debt owing to the deceased. The ruling of the
court on the first issue is not free of doubt. Legal compensation
takes place by operation of law when two debts, equally liquidated
and demandable, exist simultaneously. According to the redactors
of the Code Napoleon, the effects of compensation derive from
two propositions, viz., that compensation is (1) a double pay-
ment, and (2) a forced payinent. 17 From this point of view,
proof that compensation took place is simply proof of payment.' 8
It is not at all clear why a person should be permitted to prove
by parol that he paid a debt to a decedent and yet not be able to
prove in such fashion that compensation had taken place. Fur-
thermore, it appears probable that the purpose of the statutory
provision was to prevent proof of a debt or liability of the de-
ceased in order to collect on it. It deals with "a suit to enforce
the debt or liability." A claim of compensation offered by way
of defense bears no relationship to such a suit. Indeed, a person
might not likely contemplate suit to enforce a debt that he con-
sidered had been discharged by compensation.
PARTICULAR CONTRACTS
SALE
J. Denson Smith*
The problem of differentiating between what constitutes a
breach of contract and a breach of the implied warranty against
redhibitory vices or defects has not been adequately resolved by
the jurisprudence. It is an important one because the period of
prescription for breach of contract is ten years, whereas the
redhibitory action is subject to a basic period of one year. Also,
damages for a breach of contract are measured by losses sus-
17. 2 HENRI, L ON AND JEAN MAZEAUD, LEVONS DE DROIT CIVIL no 1154
(1962) ; 2 PLANIOL, CivmI LAW TREATISE (A TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA
STATE LAW INSTITUTE), no. 588 (1960).
18. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 1005 (1960), which treats com-
pensation as a method of extinguishment and consequently an affirmative defense.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1967]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVII
tained by the aggrieved party and the profit of which he has
been deprived, whereas the rules relating to redhibition provide
that damages are recoverable against a seller only if he had
knowledge of the defect and failed to disclose it. Otherwise, the
buyer is restricted to a return of the purchase price plus ex-
penses of the sale.
Since our Code, contrary to that of the French, subjects
declarations of quality to the rules relating to the redhibitory
action, damages can be recovered against the seller only if such
a declaration is made in bad faith. Common law authorities have
suggested in dealing with a similar problem that if the seller
delivers the kind of goods called for by the contract he does not
commit a breach of contract although the goods are not as war-
ranted. On the other hand, if he delivers something different in
kind from that called for by the contract, he does commit a
breach of contract.' In Victory Oil Co. v. Perret,2 the subject
matter was diesel fuel to be used by diesel powered trucks and
deliveries were to take place over a period of time. During the
course of performance the seller delivered some diesel fuel that
damaged defendant's trucks. The court simply took the view
that the seller had failed to deliver what he had contracted to
deliver and had, therefore, committed a breach of contract. It
likened the case to one where a seller bound to deliver kerosene
delivers gasoline instead. However, in George v. Shreveport
Cotton Oil Co.,3 where the seller who had contracted to deliver
prime cotton oil cake delivered cotton oil cake of an inferior
quality, the Supreme.Court quoted approvingly from the opinion
of the court of appeal as follows: "It is too well settled to require
any discussion here that the only remedy a purchaser has in the
event of the defective quality of the thing delivered, when, as in
this case, it has disposed of it, is an action for a diminution of
the price, as specially provided in the Civil Code, and he cannot
recover damages under the general provision of the law, as if
for the inexecution of the contract." The writer is unable to
draw any realistic distinction between the George case and the
instant case. Perhaps the denial in the latter of a writ by the
Supreme Court may cast some doubt on the former. If so, this
may be all to the good. When declarations of quality are in-
volved, it might be better to restrict the application of the rules
1. See Note, 15 LA. L. REV. 858 (1955).
2. 183 So. 2d 360 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
3. 114 La. 498, 38 So. 432 (1905).
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of redhibition to cases where the declaration is made with re-
spect to specific goods identified otherwise than by their quality.
This would mean that when the seller contracts to deliver goods
of a stated quality, the delivery of goods of a different quality
would constitute a breach of contract. This rule would be largely
free of doubt, easy to apply, and understandable to the parties.
In short, the decision in the instant case is counted as desirable
although difficult to square with the case of the cotton oil cake.
In Williams v. Daste,4 the court gave judgment to the seller
of a duplex subject to redhibitory vices for the excess of rentals
collected by the buyer on the rented portion of the structure over
the expenses of the sale and those for the preservation of the
thing. Civil Code article 2531 was cited in support. This article
recognizes inferentially that the buyer in such a case owes the
fruits of the thing to the seller. The buyer's own use of the thing
is offset by the seller's use of the price. 5
Since what purports to be an act of sale may be sustained, if
in proper form, as an act of donation, 6 it should follow that the
failure of an act of sale to state a price would not prevent it
from being translative of the property described in it. This view
was taken by the Supreme Court in a well-reasoned opinion in
Bolding v. Eason Oil Co.7 The court also held that the validity
of the act was not affected by its failure to reflect that the agent
who acted for the purchaser had a written power of attorney.
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If a landlord secures a judgment for rent to the end of the
term of the lease, the right of occupancy under the lease con-
tinues in the lessee. It is a valuable right which is subject to
seizure by the landlord or by any other judgment creditor and
can be sold independently of the lease. In this event the pur-
chaser does not become obligated to pay the rent stipulated in
4. 181 So. 2d 247 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
5. 24 LAURENT, PRINCIPES DE DROIT CIVIL 343 (1877); Farmer v. Fisk, 9
Rob. 351 (La. 1844) ; Rousseau & Co., Inc. v. Dolese, 8 La. App. 785 (1928).
6. McWilliams v. McWilliams, 39 La. Ann. 924, 3 So. 62 (1887).
7. 248 La. 269, 178 So. 2d 246 (1965).
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